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 ‘I think it’s absolutely exorbitant!’: How UK television news 
reported the shareholder vote on executive remuneration at 
Barclays in 2012.  
 
Abstract 
The most publicised rebellion during the so-called ‘Shareholder Spring’ of 2012 was at 
Barclays PLC. Using multimodal and critical discourse analysis, this paper examines how 
three UK television channels with different public service obligations covered this story on 
27
th
 April 2012. It finds that broadcasters’ regulatory obligations do not obviously impact 
content and that for example, simple reporting routines contain judgemental phrases. 
Generally the multi-dimensional nature of executive pay is simplified and the real balance 
between private and individual shareholders is obscured. Analysis also reveals that editing 
and the use of images can subtly construct discourses that may not reflect the reality of the 
dissent. The paper concludes that established criticisms that business journalism is indolent 
and that corporate discourses are privileged are not supported, but also that the coverage 
contributes little to promote wider understanding of executive pay debates.  
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Introduction 
Almost anticipating the controversy surrounding executive remuneration two thousand years 
later, Plato proposed that the highest-paid Athenians should earn no more than five times 
more than the lowest (Morrow, 1993, p.131).  More recently, Drucker suggested the ratio 
should not exceed twenty (Wartzman, 2008; Groom, 2014) but such advocacy appears 
idealistic in light of  Tesco’s Chief Executive earning 500 times more than his shelf-stackers 
(Judge, 2010), while ratios at Walt Disney apparently exceed 600:1 (Groom, 2014).  
 
Drucker’s prognosis that such inequality would generate widespread contempt (Rigby, 2011, 
p.81) proved prophetic in 2012 when ‘excessive’ pay at several UK corporations became 
headline news (see English, 2012; Williams, 2012). These rebellions are significant beyond 
their localised objectives since they implicitly challenge capitalism’s basic premise that some 
people earn more than others (Ott, 2005). Alongside public intolerance of inequality (McCall, 
2003), Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) are among those suggesting that widening income 
disparity is associated with negative health and social outcomes. Executive remuneration 
therefore, is a zeitgeist issue, and its prominence within news agendas is potentially enhanced 
by the prevailing backdrop of austerity and suggestions that the current financial crisis is the 
result of unfettered profligacy, especially within the financial sector (Shughart, 2009; 
Lawson, 2014). This paper examines how one remuneration story was reported by three UK 
television news bulletins on the same day in April, 2012.  
 
Television news bulletins have ritual, iconic and strategic importance (Fiske, 1987; Cushion, 
2012).  Blending findings that 75% of adults use television for news (Ofcom 2014) with 
suggestions by Fairclough (2003) that ‘texts’ have causal effects, TV bulletins can be 
considered a powerful news platform. Callaghan & Schnell (2001, p.203) summarise their 
reach by concluding that ‘media have the power to actively shape public discourse by 
selecting from many available frames’. Given the complexity of executive remuneration, 
audiences may rely on television news to debunk and contextualise it; its influence is further 
enhanced by the general decline in newspaper reading, and suggestions that viewers are less 
critical than readers (Belk & Kozinets, 2005, p.137). Moreover, TV news bulletins contain 
around a dozen stories versus approximately 300 in a newspaper, (Hanley, 2009, p.7); since it 
incorporates the most abridged and refined of news agendas and an inherent time constraint 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p.184), the potential to firstly tell audiences what to think about is 
compelling.  
 
In addition to providing agendas, as ‘ﬂuent, intelligible versions of the world’ (Montgomery, 
2007, p.20), TV news can also influence what viewers think about these issues. ‘Framing’ 
describes how news producers arrange information (Tuchman, 1978, p.193), providing the 
‘central organizing idea’ and story ‘essence’ (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p.143). 
Consequently, framing highlights the salience of a particular line of interpretation, or 
promotes the interests of some groups rather than others (Hannah & Cafferty, 2006; Reese, 
2007). According to Entman (1993, p.151), framing defines issues, interprets causality, 
evaluates moral dimensions and prescribes solutions. News reports about executive 
remuneration can therefore shape opinions (Herbst, 1998) which may themselves then 
function as ‘disciplining devices’ for private and public policymaking (Kuhnen & Niessen, 
2012, p.1250). This paper considers the coverage of the shareholder vote regarding 
remuneration at Barclays PLC as it appeared on BBC, ITV and SKY news bulletins on 27th 
April, 2012. The following appraisal of literature comprises of an examination of the 
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reporting of economic issues generally and a review of general themes associated with 
executive remuneration practice.  
 
According to normative theories of news production, Economic, Business and Financial 
journalism - hereafter called ‘EBF journalism’ (Merrill, 2012) - should be a ‘trusted ally’ for 
concerned citizens (Schifferes & Coulter, 2012, p.2) and ‘untangle the complicated’ 
(Seymour, 2009, p.8). However, it is claimed that practitioners are scarce (Whitney & 
Wartella, 2000), inadequately trained (Doyle, 2007; Merrill, 2012) and prone to inaccurate 
reporting (Maier, 2002; Fost, 2002) while the profession generally recruits from a narrow, 
privileged demographic (Edwards & Cromwell, 2009). Against prescriptions that EBF 
journalism should hold commerce to account, instead there are accusations that it champions 
wealth, success and the narrow interests of businesses themselves (Tambini, 2010; 
McChesney, 2003; Lewis 2013). 
 
Another debate concerns whether news is ‘dumbed down’ (see Doyle, 2007; Franklin, 1997). 
Some argue simplifying complex issues engages a wider audience (Temple, 2006; Langer, 
1998) than simply ‘older white males’ (Hargreaves & Thomas, 2002, p.53). However, the 
BBC for example, is under increasing commercial pressure (Foster & Meek, 2008) perhaps 
inevitably resulting in ‘simpler’ news. Consequently, senior BBC journalists have expressed 
concern that the channel’s news agenda has become increasingly tabloid and celebrity-led 
(Jury, 2002; Bingham, 2008). Allied with theories of insufficient probing, there are also 
claims that EBF reporting is overly reliant on sources from influential institutions (Berry, 
2012), summarised by Lewis (2013, p.122) as deferring to the ‘same well-heeled sources that 
created or failed to anticipate the crisis in the first place’. Doyle (2007) contends that 
‘experts’ for example, are rarely ‘disinterested’ and that their insights usually benefit 
institutional investors. The compelling conclusion is that critics of EBF journalism 
significantly outnumber its supporters. 
 
Scrutiny of EBF issues increases during time of financial crisis (Kjær & Slaatta, 2007; 
Anderson, 2004), particularly since in the past several financial scandals have not been 
anticipated in advance (Doyle, 2007; Tambini, 2010). The leitmotif of ‘excess’ is prominent 
within remuneration scholarship (Lissy & Morgenstern, 1994; Brown, 1992), especially as 
cutbacks are made in the name of ‘austerity’ (Dittmann, Maug, & Zhang, 2011, p.1202) at the 
same time executives receive increasingly attractive remuneration packages (Gómez-Mejia & 
Wiseman 1997). There is also a contentious debate regarding the correlation between 
remuneration and performance, with some unsurprisingly finding that rewarding apparently 
substandard performance causes widespread angst (Perkins, 2009; Lissy & Morgenstern, 
1994; Brown, 1992). In contrast, other research claims associations between pay levels and 
growth, share price and profitability (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Deckop, 1988). Executive 
remuneration packages have also become more complex, and now typically contain a basic 
salary plus bonuses, stock options and pension elements (Dymond & Murlis, 2008).  
Consequently, there are suggestions that true remuneration levels are being ‘camouflaged’ by 
these complicating dimensions (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Kay & Van Putten, 2007), and that 
remuneration committees are deferential to those whose pay they set (Crystal 1992; Lambert, 
Larcker & Weigelt, 1993).   
 
Within the era of austerity many ‘ordinary’ citizens are finding that debt is more difficult to 
service while borrowing is restricted, welfare payments are cut and non-essential purchases 
are less affordable. Within the public sector, the enforcement of pay freezes and lower-than-
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inflation increases has contrasted markedly with reports of MPs claiming expenses for moat 
cleaning and the maintenance of helipads and swimming pools (Winnett 2009). Against a 
similarly grim backdrop within the private sector, stories of corporate apartments finished 
with ‘$6,000 shower curtains’ and ‘$15,000 umbrella stands’ (English 2003) have become 
indexical of the perceived disparity between those controlling and managing large 
corporations and their rank and file employees. Votes regarding executive remuneration are 
tangible, public platforms for expressing dissent over such alleged excess; such conflict and 
the challenging of corporate power offer broadcasters opportunities to provide wider 
commentaries about austerity and the financial climate. 
 
Notwithstanding the contentious nature of contemporary executive remuneration, there is 
only a small corpus of research into its media coverage. Core, Guay & Larcker (2008) 
consider newspaper coverage of executive pay debates and unsurprisingly conclude that high 
pay results in critical media coverage. Media coverage can also impact executive pay levels 
(Kuhnen & Niessen, 2010); equally predictably are findings that within US and UK 
newspapers leaning to the political left, executive pay is framed as a potentially vote-
attracting issue (Culpepper 2012). Tan & Crombie (2011) investigate stakeholder 
legitimisations regarding the remuneration of the New Zealand Telecom Chief Executive and 
find that both media and the public consider executive pay as excessive, but cite few 
examples of discourses used by executives themselves. Hamilton & Zeckhauser (2004) 
examine coverage of CEOs generally between 1970 and 1999 rather than their remuneration 
per se. They find that when the economy suffered, CEO coverage increased, indicating that 
‘bad news’ attracted EBF journalists. In the same way CEOs are ‘saints and then sinners’ 
they suggest, coverage is subject to ‘fits and fads’ (Hamilton & Zeckhauser, 2004, p.4) and in 
general, coverage of CEOs is reactive to the demands of news consumers. Such findings 
implicitly suggest the media and their audiences find stories about executive pay especially 
newsworthy; indeed a TV news anchor is quoted as suggesting that ‘big pay packages for 
executives, big takeover targets, the huge corporate egos involved – these kinds of stories 
beat an episode of Dallas any day’ (Hamilton & Zeckhauser, 2004, p.3).  
 
Theoretical approach and sample  
 
This paper adopts epistemological assumptions consistent with critical realism, enhancing 
explanations of ‘how’ things happen with dimensions of ‘why’ (Guba & Lincoln, 2003, 
p.211). Wright (2011, p.160) validates critical realism as ‘ethically and politically suited’ to 
media research since it holds newsmakers to account for their output by examining the 
influencing circumstances and structures. This paper considers therefore, how such structures 
and circumstances determine the presentation of the Barclays’ shareholder vote. 
 
When examining media output, the theory of political economy examines how ownership and 
control influence content (Hartley, 2011, p.203). McManus (1991) suggests political 
economy exists on macro, meso and micro levels. These respectively relate to the pursuit of 
corporate profit, the institutional constraints shaping news and the response to demands for 
certain types of news. The analysis that follows uses this broad taxonomy to evaluate the 
three news reports in question.  
 
The first of these elements - the pursuit of profit - is an established discourse; Herman & 
Chomsky (2002) contend that the large corporations owning media outlets have become 
increasingly concentrated, are solely motivated by financial return and have symbiotic links 
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with commerce and government. In terms of the type and shape of stories covered, political 
economy suggests that editors ‘follow the money’ (Devereux, 1998, p.102). Consequently, 
and resonant with EBF journalism research, this analysis examines whether commercial 
channels offer more listless critiques of the remuneration controversy associated with a bank 
who may simultaneously provide it with advertising revenue. It also investigates whether the 
BBC performs according to its public service function and adheres to the Reithian promise to 
‘inform, educate and entertain’ (Cushion, 2012; Debrett, 2010). 
                
Another element of the model proposed by McManus (1991) is the provision of news 
according to demand. This could be interpreted as adhering to established models of ‘news 
values’ or the characteristics within stories and events that editors anticipate their particular 
audiences will prefer (see Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; Harrison, 2006). 
There are several elements within executive remuneration stories that news producers may 
find attractive. First, there is ‘negativity’ and ‘conflict’ as stakeholder groups may disagree 
about pay levels. Furthermore, attention is inevitably focussed on ‘elite’ personalities and in 
2012, such stories also offered ‘continuity’ in that they were part of the ongoing ‘Shareholder 
Spring’.  
 
Notions of morality may be the most pertinent feature of remuneration stories, especially 
during post-crisis austerity. Despite claims that people accept inequality in a similar way they 
accept the weather - factually, rather than morally since they are apparently powerless to 
change it (Scott, 1982, p. 57), Kendall (2012) points out the commonsense notion of morally 
opposing what may be out of normal reach. The reporting of seemingly limitless  
remuneration while many slip towards poverty may tap into a readiness to feel outraged 
within watching audiences; reports can further accentuate emotive responses for example, by 
describing a morally-charged ‘inequality’ rather than the less pejorative ‘gap’ (Ryscavage 
2009, p.15). Finally in terms of salaries, ballot results, corporate performance details, other 
numerical data and ‘fact’, viewer perceptions that broadcasters are ‘spinning’ and mediating 
stories are minimised. This paper asks whether such news values are evident within the 
presentation of the three reports. 
 
Each report comprises of still photographs, onscreen graphics, video footage and utterances 
from journalists, politicians, corporate spokespersons and others. The stories analysed were 
taken from ITV (6.30pm bulletin), SKY (9pm bulletin) and the BBC (10pm bulletin) which 
are routinely recorded by Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. The 
U.K’s broadcasting system is a ‘mixed model’ combining public service obligations with 
commercial elements (Leiss & Botterill, 2005, p.112) and the channels chosen for analysis 
reflect the breadth of this model. Ofcom (2014) find that the BBC, ITV and SKY are the 
three most widely-viewed sources of UK broadcast news, and the raison d’être and regulatory 
burden of each can be contextualised as the institutional constraints noted by McManus 
(1991). The three channels can be described thus: 
 
BBC - The public service broadcaster is funded by a licence fee, and its output is determined 
by Royal Charter. Former Chairman Michael Grade asserted that ‘the BBC has a duty to set a 
gold standard in news reporting’ in terms of ‘accuracy’ and ‘impartiality’ (Machin, 2008, 
p.60). However, there are more recent suggestions that it has ‘been pushed to the right’ 
(Burrell, 2014). 
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The other broadcasters considered here have their output determined by Ofcom, a ‘light 
touch’ regulatory body (Barnett, 2012).  
 
ITV - This commercial broadcaster comprises of a network of independent regional 
organisations owned by Carlton-Granada (Cushion, 2012, p.118) and is funded by advertising 
revenue (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p.1). Among UK commercial broadcasters, ITV carries 
the heaviest public service regulatory burden (Cushion, Lewis, & Ramsay, 2012, p.835). 
 
SKY – This satellite commercial broadcaster is owned by News Corporation (Schlesinger 
2006, p.300) and is funded by subscriptions and advertising. Despite being obliged to provide 
impartial journalism, it is not actually obliged to provide news or current affairs at all; 
consequently of the three channels it has the lightest regulatory obligations (Cushion, 
Lewis, & Ramsay, 2012). Indeed, Cushion (2010, p.115) suggests SKY News is a rather 
unexpected enterprise given the rest of Rupert Murdoch’s broadcasting portfolio, also noting 
suspicions from others that may it be strategically attempting to upgrade SKY’s wider brand 
image.  
 
Research Method 
Firstly, ‘text’ is used here in its widest definition to include TV news reports. Widdowson 
(2000, p.22) asserts that consumers of texts understand them in ‘normal pragmatic ways, 
inferring meanings’. Consequently, and consistent with critical realism (Farrelly, 2010; 
Iosifide, 2011) social actor speech within these reports was analysed using Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). Viewing language as ‘everywhere’ and ‘always political’ (Gee, 1999, p.1), 
CDA aims to reveal ‘forensic goals, hidden meanings and value structures’ (Coupland & 
Jaworski 2006, p.33). It connects texts to social structures, which in this case could include 
broadcasting corporations, political parties and shareholder alliances. CDA examines how 
language is ideologically commandeered (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.2) and pertinently for 
studying contentious remuneration debates, Montgomery (2007, p.20) implicitly ratifies CDA 
by suggesting that ‘reflective commentary’ of broadcast news considers ‘bias, 
(mis)representation, inaccuracy, distortion, ideology, “dumbing-down” and selective 
construction’. 
                      
Montgomery (2007) also asserts that broadcasting employs different operational practices to 
those used in print; news is consumed in real time, and in an order determined by the TV 
news editor. Analysing TV news therefore requires techniques that are specifically sensitive 
to it and accordingly, CDA increasingly incorporates examining modes of visual 
communication as well as verbal ones. Analysis of words is enhanced by considering 
‘images, layouts, gestures, and sounds’ to provide ‘enriching and insightful analysis’ (Lazar, 
2007, p.144). Pertinent for news analysis, multi-modal approaches propose that like words, 
images also carry ideological loadings (Machin, 2007; Kress & Van Leewen, 1996).  
 
The analytical techniques associated with CDA have been applied to news broadcasts 
internationally, for example to examine coverage of Hurricane Katrina (Johnson, Sonnett, 
Dolan, Reppen, & Johnson 2010), the reporting of SARS in Belgium (Joye, 2010) and 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Pankov, Miheli, & Bajt 2011). This research takes a 
similar approach to Ekstrom (2001) in that it quantifies some rudimentary variables to 
supplement CDA; the small quantitative element includes timing report lengths and the 
lengths of the journalistic contributions within them.  
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This paper addresses the following questions: 
 
‘What discourses and news frames characterise the news reports covering the Barclays 
shareholder vote on executive remuneration on 27
th
 April 2012 as shown BBC, ITV and 
SKY?’    
‘Which types of social actors are interviewed and quoted within the reports?’ 
and 
‘How do different levels of regulatory obligation shape how the three broadcasters present 
the story?’  
Ahead of a discussion about the wider implications of the findings, each report is described 
and presented in a two-columned table reflecting the simultaneous nature of verbal and visual 
dimensions. The descriptions include report lengths measured from the beginning of the first 
word relating to the item (excluding any appearances in headlines at the start of the bulletins) 
and the length of journalistic contributions, which are defined as the verbal commentaries 
made by anchors or reporters, rather than those offered by other social actors or groups.  
 
 
Findings 
The BBC report 
 
Length of report: 3 minutes: 14 seconds 
Length of journalistic contribution: 1 minute: 58 seconds (60.8% of total report) 
 
Table 1 – The BBC Report 
 
Visual Verbal 
Backdrop of Barclays logo and photograph of 
CEO Bob Diamond. 
Anchor Fiona Bruce introduces the story. 
Graphic explaining details of Diamond’s 
proposed pay. 
Business Editor Robert Peston describes 
shareholder unhappiness. 
Vox populis with shareholders outside the 
meeting, speaking to unseen interviewer. 
Shareholders give their views – they are 
critical of the pay by a factor of 3:1. 
Peston speaks to camera outside shareholder 
meeting. 
Peston explains the imbalance between 
Barclays’ share dividends and their total 
payroll costs. 
Tim Bush (Pensions and Investment 
Research Group) speaks to unseen 
interviewer. 
Comments on remuneration levels. 
Sarah Wilson (Manifest) speaks to unseen 
interviewer. 
Comments on remuneration levels. 
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Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills Vince Cable speaks to unseen 
interviewer. 
Comments about how rewards should be 
appropriate. 
Barclays CEO Bob Diamond drinks wine at a 
social event. 
Peston concludes the report. 
 
Lexical choices (i.e. words specifically selected ahead of appropriate alternatives) reveal 
overriding discourses (Machin & Mayr, 2012) and convey value judgments and meanings 
(Richardson, 2007). Consequently, in her introduction Fiona Bruce makes evaluative 
selections when describing the ‘powerful message’ about ‘big’ bonuses and Bob Diamond’s 
‘huge’ pay. Furthermore, the term ‘revolt’ to describe shareholder dissent evokes a larger-
scale conflict despite the vote against being only ‘nearly 27%’. 
 
Social actor ‘agency’ describes those with ‘power’ (Machin, 2007, p.123). Noting the 
‘powerful message’, their ‘stand’ and ‘protest’, Bruce gives agency to shareholders rather 
than to Barclays who are positioned on the receiving end of the voter dissent. Throughout the 
report, despite one ambiguous reference to ‘big shareholders’, neither Bruce nor Peston 
differentiate between private and institutional shareholders, and via the technique of 
collectivization (van Leeuwen 1996, p.49), frequent references to ‘many’ represents investors 
as a homogenous group. Describing investors as cognate implies shared traits and mentalities 
(Reisigl & Wodak 2001, p.63), and here it is generally unclear whether the protest includes 
institutional, private shareholders or both. 
 
However, it is inferred from the appearance, clothing, proximity and a lack of evidence to the 
contrary that the contributing shareholders within the vox populis are private individuals (see 
Figure 1). Three of these shareholders express discontent about Diamond’s remuneration in 
terms of their dividend payments. One in particular makes strong lexical choices of 
‘exorbitant’ pay and ‘paltry’ dividends and notably, a 27% shareholder ‘revolt’ is not 
reflected onscreen; critical shareholders outnumber supportive ones by 3:1.  
 
Figure 1. Shareholders are critical of the pay award. 
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By suggesting Barclays have ‘short-changed’ shareholders, Robert Peston establishes a moral 
backdrop invoking the bank’s rightful duties and responsibilities (see Harré & Van 
Langenhove, 1999). He accentuates the negativity and embellishes the conflict by asserting 
that shareholder disquiet has ‘gone global’, albeit his corroborative evidence involves only 
two other countries. 
 
Whoever the ‘big shareholders’ are, they apparently have no voice in the report and their 
agency is removed. Tim Bush of Pensions and Investment Research Consultants establishes 
the familiar structural opposition between reward and performance (see Figure 2) and his 
statement is notable for its high modality - the measure of the ‘degree of commitment to the 
factuality of statements’ (Saeed, 1997, p .125).  
 
Figure 2. The comments by Tim Bush. 
                           
 
Bush’s lexical choices of ‘significant’, ‘whatsoever’, performance going ‘backwards’ and 
rewarding ‘failure’ make for a damning critique. The absence of any modal qualifiers like 
‘possibly’ and probably’ defining the strength of a claim (Flick 1998; Quinton & Smallbone 
2006, p.19) enhance it further. Sarah Wilson from Manifest uses the metaphor of change at 
the ‘top table’, invoking associations with fine dining. Bob Diamond is later seen drinking 
wine, reinforcing notions of indulgence (see Figure 3). Barclays themselves are indirectly 
quoted, and their Chairman offers a concessionary apology, for not listening to shareholder 
views well enough, rather than for the levels of pay involved. Arguably this expression of 
regret, such as it is, is nullified by an uncompromising and highly modal assertion that 
removing bonuses ‘is not an option’. 
 
Figure 3. The concluding image. 
                       
 
In April 2012, the minister overseeing any legislative process concerning shareholder power 
was Vince Cable. His contribution to this report reflects the political element within debates 
about executive remuneration, and whether governments should intervene in such matters 
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within neoliberal economic systems. Referring to shareholders, he suggests that ‘... they, like 
me want to see good business and successful business properly rewarded...’ This associates 
him with commonsense notions about fair reward, resonant with the concept of conforming / 
decoupling, where legitimisation is achieved by association oneself with what appear to be 
acceptable values (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). By suggesting that ‘where pay is excessive and 
unreasonable, shareholders have got to take responsibility and act...’ Cable places agency 
with investors and perhaps mitigates government obligations, consistent with a free-market 
ethos. Moreover, his comments could be interpreted as a further call to action aimed towards 
investors. 
 
This the lead story within the BBC bulletin. As the corporation does not rely on advertising 
revenue, positioning shareholder disquiet and controversial remuneration as apparently the 
day’s top story supports theories that the BBC may be comfortable criticising commercial 
organisations. Furthermore, it develops a political dimension to the story absent from the 
other reports considered here, underpinning notions that it offers an ‘establishment view’ 
(Hargreaves, 2003, p.27). In sum, notwithstanding the BBC’s imperative for high standards 
of objectivity, the report describes Barclays’ intransigence regarding bonus payments, its 
unwillingness to compromise, and concludes with Bob Diamond drinking wine. The 
conclusion is that the general theme of conflict is preferred to any explanation about the 
cause, effect and wider implications of executive remuneration or indeed any sort of 
justification for them. 
 
The SKY report 
Length of report: 3 minutes: 8 seconds 
Length of journalistic contribution: 1 minute: 53 seconds (60.1% of total report). 
 
Table 2 – The SKY Report 
 
Visual Verbal 
Plain backdrop. Anchor Mark Longhurst introduces the story 
Shareholder protests outside the AGM and a 
brief exchange between disagreeing 
shareholders 
Reporter Tadhg Enright describes the 
disagreements. 
Cllr. Peter Brayshaw (Local Authority 
Pension Fund) speaks to unseen interviewer. 
Comments about the wider implications of 
executive remuneration. 
Louise Rouse (Fair Pensions Campaigner 
speaks to unseen interviewer. 
Comments about the wider implications of 
protest. 
Bob Diamond making a short statement to a 
Commons Select Committee 
Suggests that ‘banker remorse’ should end. 
Graphic outlining proposed pay, and a 
statement by Barclays Chairman Marcus 
Aguis 
Enright outlines details of remuneration 
package. 
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Tadhg Enright speaks to camera outside the 
meeting. 
Explains balance between dividends and 
payroll. 
Simon Walker (Institute of Directors) speaks 
to unseen interviewer. 
Calls for balance to be restored. 
Shareholders leave meeting. Enright concludes the report. 
 
Mark Longhurst opens by reporting that ‘more than a quarter of Barclays’ shareholders voted 
against the bank’s controversial pay deals’. With the vote set as the dominant clause, 
Longhurst establishes ‘protest’ as the story’s central frame. ‘Rhetoric’ is the process of 
persuasion (Burke 1969) and within the concept, Atkinson (1984) posits that developing a 
‘contrast’ is a familiar device; by describing the vote as ‘a quarter against’ rather than ‘three 
quarters for’, Longhurst institutes an early discourse of conflict, perpetuated by suggestions 
that high remuneration prevails despite poor corporate results.  
Reporter Tadhg Enright continues the conflict binary between executives and shareholders by 
describing the increasing gap between salaries and dividends. van Leeuwen and Wodak 
(1999) outline the linguistic strategy of rationalisation as legitimising a position by 
associating it with values widely understood as valid; here, Enright contextualises the vote by 
suggesting the issue is relevant to the retirement pensions received by the population at large. 
This is the only report that contextualises this issue quite so broadly. 
 
Moreover, SKY’s coverage is also notable in that it more clearly delineates corporate 
shareholders from private ones, emphasised by contributions from Louise Rouse and Cllr. 
Peter Brayshaw. Rouse represents ShareAction, which further research reveals to be a charity 
promoting responsible investment by pension funds and fund managers. In citing ‘ordinary’ 
people and jobs, Brayshaw invokes a moral justification (van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) by 
referring to the specific - and resonably assumed to be popular - notion that public service 
pensions must be honoured (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. An explanation of the wider relevance of the vote. 
             
Enright enhances this point by suggesting that institutional investors ‘are pension funds that 
many, if not most of us, depend on to fund our retirements”;  in so doing he connects the 
story to a much wider audience than simply the business community. He also describes the 
vote as ‘democracy at work’, albeit institutional investors ‘tend not to speak out’.  
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The verbal exchange between two unidentified men outside the meeting highlights a lack of 
shareholder consensus; one protestor invokes a rational argument indicating the potential 
consequences of continued protest but the exchange is generally rather esoteric and 
ambiguous. This advances the theme of conflict beyond the Barclays/Shareholder binary; 
disagreement is now shown to exist within the shareholder community itself.  Simon Walker 
from the Institute of Directors then describes Bob Diamond as a ‘superstar’; this is exemplar 
of the discursive device of ‘identity ascription’ which maps ‘traits, attitudes and moral 
dispositions’ to social actors (see Antaki, 1998, p.71; Whittle & Mueller, 2011, p.124).  The 
choice to include descriptions of a highly-paid ‘superstar’ is in notable contrast to those with 
lower-ranking jobs whose pensions may be threatened. 
  
This distinction is strengthened further when Diamond asserts that the ‘period of remorse and 
apology for banks... needs to be over’. However, this is an isolated prescription, with no 
accompanying reasoning and may be considered contentious and inflammatory; using a quote 
from 2011 and therefore out of context adds to the case that a discourse of ‘conflict’ is being 
determinedly constructed. Furthermore, Barclays Chairman Marcus Aguis then demonstrates 
low modality by preceding the concession of some wrongdoing with the approximator 
‘evidently’ (see Figure 5), suggesting something less than his full agreement that wrong has 
actually been done. Thereafter, he apologises for poor communication rather than for high 
pay levels, and promises no more than better ‘engagement’ with shareholders in the future, 
exemplar of evading the central point of high pay with ‘euphemism, question-begging and 
sheer cloudy vagueness’ (Orwell, 1974).  
 
 
Figure 5. The Chairman’s ‘apology’ 
 
                                          
 
One manifestation of SKY’s lesser regulatory encumbrance could be a more lowbrow 
approach to news (Hargreaves & Thomas, 2002) and a preference for dramatising and 
featuring stories more often found in tabloid newspapers (Cushion & Lewis, 2009). Here for 
example, SKY builds the conflict binary and focuses specific and unflattering attention on 
two senior Barclays executives, presenting them as phlegmatic, belligerent and only 
grudgingly apologetic. Nevertheless, SKY’s approach is inconsistent with what may be 
reasonably expected from a lightly-regulated commercial channel. Unlike the other channels, 
SKY express executive remuneration within a wider context and also make attempts to 
explain the real shareholder power dynamic and the low potential impact of the dissenting 
vote. 
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The ITV report 
Length of report: 2 minutes: 38 seconds 
Length of journalistic contribution: 1 minute: 58 seconds (74.7% of total report). 
 
Table 3 – The ITV Report 
 
Visual Verbal 
Plain backdrop. Anchor Alastair Stewart introduces the story. 
Unknown man - later identified to be David 
Stredder (UK Individual Shareholders 
Society) - prepares to leave home. 
Business Editor Laura Kuenssberg describes 
the shareholder stand. 
Stredder speaks to unseen interviewer at an 
unidentified railway station. 
Comments about the incongruence of 
executive pay within the general economy. 
Graphic explaining the composition of the 
proposed pay and magnitude of the vote 
against it. 
Kuenssberg provides commentary. 
Stredder enters the meeting with protesters in 
the background 
Kuenssberg explains that overseas voters 
dominated the vote. 
Main door is bolted. Kuenssberg explains that cameras were 
barred from entering. 
Kuenssberg speaks to camera outside 
meeting. 
Kuenssberg explains that cameras were 
barred from the meeting and describes the 
general mood inside. 
Frank Clark (Barclays Shareholder) speaks to 
unseen interviewer. 
Defends high pay. 
Lucy Marcus (Corporate Consultant) speaks 
to unseen interviewer. 
Advocates more transparent remuneration. 
Long shot of meeting and Stredder’s return 
home. 
Kuenssberg providing summarising 
voiceover. 
 
Anchor Alastair Stewart opens with the striking lexical choices of ‘remarkable’ barracking, 
shareholder ‘fury’ and ‘bumper’ pay.  Many may concur that Diamond’s pay is high by most 
ordinary measures, but arguably ITV purposefully and consciously appraise this salary as 
high even within the context of the prevailing executive pay culture. Once again, lexical 
choices initiate discourses of conflict and protest; furthermore the use of ‘remarkable’ aligns 
the story with the traditional news value of ‘unexpectedness’ (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup 
& O’Neill, 2001). 
In common with the BBC report, ITV Business Editor Laura Kuenssberg does not offer any 
real insight into the difference between private and institutional shareholders or the numerical 
split, but describes a homogenous ‘thousands of others’ who ‘are off to stand up to a rich and 
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powerful institution’. By establishing one man - David Stredder – as representative of the 
revolt, Kuenssberg establishes a conflict where one side is identified with and clearly 
valorised (Montgomery, 2007, p.3); perhaps the wider audience may naturally identify with 
David Stredder as a contemporary ‘David’ attempting to slay ‘Goliath’ (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. David Stredder begins his journey. 
             
 
Kuenssberg uses further evaluative lexical choices describing ‘booing’ and ‘laughter’ at the 
shareholder vote, rather than more neutral descriptions such as ‘Barclays’ explanation did not 
satisfy the shareholders’, or something similar. Kuenssberg also describes being prevented 
from entering the meeting and highlights the obstruction (alongside images of doors being 
bolted) by stating that ‘protestors were kept out and we couldn’t take our cameras in’ (see 
Figure 7).  Seemingly opposition and protest is accompanied by secrecy and obstruction. 
 
Figure 7. ITV are locked out of the shareholder meeting. 
              
 
Contrasting with thematic framings of news which give general evidence within wider 
contexts (Darwish, 2010, p.138) evident within the other reports, Kuenssberg employs an 
episodic construction featuring David Stredder’s journey to the Barclays meeting as the 
central element. He is seen leaving home, arriving in London, entering the meeting and 
finally beginning his return journey some time later. This narrative spans the entire report and 
is indicative of the general shareholder quest. In contrast with the other reports however, 
Kuenessberg explains the multi-dimensional composition of the executive pay package by 
explaining that although the pay was ‘set at six point three million’ if you ‘count long term 
incentives’ then the total ‘is more than seventeen’.  
 
As with the BBC report, air time is given to a shareholder who apparently supports the pay 
award. Frank Clark - ambiguously identified as a ‘Barclays Shareholder’ but presumably 
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speaking only for himself - uses a basic economic rationalisation whereby ‘if we pay him 
twenty million pounds and he brings in a hundred million pounds, we’re making eighty 
million pounds profit’. ITV chose a sound bite from Clark which, as in case of the SKY 
report, ascribes ‘superstar’ status to an unnamed Barclays executive. This character is 
apparently personally and singularly responsible for profitable results, the details of which 
are not referred to elsewhere in this or any of the other reports. Clark’s coda of ‘...what they 
moaning about?” emphasises disunity within the shareholder community. The vaguely-
labelled “Corporate Consultant’ Lucy Marcus describes a time of extraordinary change, 
which without further elaboration, sits incongruously alongside the reality of a non-binding 
dissenting vote amounting to just 27% against.          
           
Only ITV do not specifically mention Bob Diamond, and they position the story seventh in 
their running order. Both may be unsurprising given that ITV is funded by advertising 
revenue, provided by corporations like Barclays and others like them. By these measures, 
ITV’s coverage seems pro-business in that they are not explicitly critical of specific 
personalities and do not prioritise the story within their running order. Nonetheless, their tone 
and framing is explicitly critical; for example, Kuenssberg’s descriptions of being prevented 
entry to the AGM and the general shareholder derision are elements absent from the other 
reports. In this respect, ITV contravenes commonsense notions that they might take a more 
benign stance regarding corporate controversies. 
 
With an episodic framing focussing on David Stredder’s journey however, ITV significantly 
simplifies executive remuneration for public consumption. Riker (1993) and Ness (2008) 
assert that episodic framings are more likely to generate viewer empathy and interest, perhaps 
amplified here by a ‘David versus Goliath’ narrative reflecting the ‘underdog’ taking on a 
powerful global banking institution. Within this sample at least, such constructions 
undermine notions that only corporate elites feature within EBF journalism (Davis, 2000, 
p.293). However, episodic framings also reduce complex issues ‘to the level of anecdotal 
evidence’ (Iyengar, 1991, p.136–137) where context is removed and coverage reduced to a 
‘fleeting parade of events’ (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2010, p.493) meaning understandings 
are ‘disorganized and isolated’ (de Vreese, 2004, p.38). In sum, instead of offering wider 
analysis, ITV represents the general issue of executive pay with one shareholder’s literal and 
metaphorical journey and their barred entry to an unruly AGM. It is a good example perhaps, 
of ‘image crowding out rational analysis’ (Bird, 2000, p.221).    
 
Discussion  
Despite ‘consensual’ views that journalists seek the truth (Machin, 2008, p.62), media 
scholarship proposes that news is not objective reality, but a construction of it (Potter, 2010, 
p.157). Consequently, representations of the shareholder vote comprise of the visual and 
verbal elements determined by news editors. Explicitly or implicitly, consciously or 
unconsciously, some elements of reality are included while others are excluded or 
marginalised (Montgomery, 2007). Consequently, social actors are seemingly powerless over 
the ways they are edited and contextualised; therefore conclusions here can only be drawn 
about editorial choices and the ways channels decided to present the Barclays vote.   
 
As a precursor to the discussion of findings, a BBC News report on 15
th
 May 2009 is 
exemplar of how TV news might shape understandings of executive pay. Surrounded by 
bottles of champagne, Robert Peston describes a ‘big buck bonus culture’ within the banking 
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sector, connoting excess and affluence, and confirming the importance of visual elements 
within news reports. Such imagery is ‘highly salient for viewers’ (Gilens, 1996, p.528) to the 
extent that it can even ‘take precedence over the story itself’ (Robinson, Else, Sherlock, & 
Zass-Ogilvie, 2009, p.15). This paper has sought to advance such ideas, and coverage of the 
Barclays remuneration vote across three broadcasters also enables some direct comparison. 
To address the first two research questions however, there are also common themes that may 
have wider relevance.   
 
First, the reports are all of similar length and characterised by the discourse of conflict. This 
story might not actually have been considered newsworthy to begin with - after all, 73% of 
shareholders did not vote against the pay award. Instead, the facts – that pay is widely 
perceived as high and some shareholders disputed it – are actively constructed using the 
emotive language of ‘revolt’. Out-of-context apologies and belligerent statements about 
bonuses alongside images of wine drinking and socialising enhance likely outrage from the 
watching audience. Furthermore, and resonating with themes within EBF reporting and 
remuneration research, experts often have unclear affiliations, there is a well-defined theme 
of ‘excess’ and seemingly the links between pay and performance are tenuous. By 
marginalising or ignoring the complicating dimensions of executive remuneration, there is a 
general simplification consistent with theories that some stories will attract news editors more 
than others. Narratives about conflict, and even ‘conflict within conflict’ are highlighted, 
while justifying high remuneration, its cause and effect, and explanations of the wider logics 
of capitalism are generally ignored. None of the reports make even the briefest of attempts to 
defend such high remuneration levels. 
 
In the BBC and ITV reports, but to a lesser degree SKY, attention is concentrated on private 
shareholders who are seen as implicitly holding sufficient power to affect change, albeit 
coverage of private shareholders is disproportionate with the real investor power dynamic. 
The reality is that ‘other businesses’ own corporations like Barclays (Watson, 2008, p.186) 
and that institutional investors are more influential than private ones (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2001); the Office for National Statistics (2012, p.1) provide emphatic confirmation by 
showing that in 2012, individuals owned only 11.5% of available UK shares. Only SKY 
make it clear that institutional shareholders hold the balance of power, and that even if those 
voting against remuneration policy had won by even a significant majority, it would not have 
been binding. ITV’s implicit narrative of private shareholding therefore obscures the realities 
of corporate ownership; ‘David’, or for that matter even many ‘Davids’ acting together will 
never slay ‘Goliath’. Meanwhile, the absence of large shareholders within the reports may be 
explained by their generally passive stance regarding such issues (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2001; Sheehan, 2011). 
 
In addition to the ambiguous power dynamic, there are claims that the ‘Shareholder Spring’ 
itself may simply be a media construction. Hyde (2012) for example, questions the 
associating of shareholder rebellion with the ‘Arab Spring’; she challenges how ‘brutal 
regimes’ can be compared to the ‘courage’ needed to attend an AGM ‘at the Canary Wharf 
Hilton’ to complain about unsatisfactory dividends. Robert Peston concurs the ‘Shareholder 
Spring’ was a ‘myth’ (see Hosking 2012; Moore 2013); just weeks after the report in this 
sample was broadcast, he notes that dissenting shareholder votes in 2012 were significantly 
less than the levels recorded for example, in 2002 and 2003 (Peston 2012). Indeed, while a 
27% vote against the Barclays remuneration policy in 2012 merited a lead position and a 
report lasting over three minutes within the BBC report, in 2014 the Barclays vote against 
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was 34% (Spanier, 2014: Pratley, 2014) yet it did not appear at all in the corresponding BBC 
bulletin. Shareholder disagreement is part of daily corporate life but without sharp focus on a 
central protaganist (Diamond) and other simultaneous protests (the wider ‘Shareholder 
Spring’), the 2014 vote seemingly lacked sufficient momentum to propel it onto television 
news agendas. 
 
Evaluative lexical choices evident within the reports exemplify the paradox in contemporary 
TV news reporting as defined by Pounds (2012). First, TV news is legally bound to standards 
of impartiality more demanding than those applied to the written press (Montgomery, 2007, 
p. 12–13). However, the strong visual dimension offers more opportunities to evoke emotion 
within presentations and the responses to them. While research suggests printed media shows 
no such ‘emotion’ (Martin & White, 2005) and despite normative suggestions that news 
anchors should operate within restricted emotional ranges without revealing their social 
positioning (Montgomery, 2007), Pounds (2012) suggests emotion is pervasive in TV news 
via verbal (lexical choice and voice intonation) and non-verbal means (facial expression, 
gestures and body language). Despite concerns that ‘emotionalizing’ news could indicate 
falling journalistic standards (Pantti, 2010), the three news anchors in this sample make 
evaluative choices. The judgmental language they use indicates that increasingly, editors and 
journalists are the chief sense-makers about executive remuneration, privileging some 
discourses and suppressing others (see Kjaer & Slaatta, 2007). This is especially true in the 
case of ITV, where commentary and interpretation accounts for almost 75% of the report 
time.While these scripts and choices possibly signal institutional and personal agendas, it can 
be concluded more certainly that none of the featured ‘experts’ could be reasonably described 
as neutral or impartial. Tim Bush, Sarah Walker and Lucy Marcus represent Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants (PIRC), Manifest and Marcus Venture Consulting 
respectively; all are organisations closely allied to institutional shareholders. Simon Walker 
represents the Institute of Directors - their mission is to develop the interests of its members - 
by definition these are the recipients of high end salaries.  
However, established theories that EBF journalism is insufficiently critical of business are 
not supported by this small qualitatively-analysed sample. Indeed, arguably there are 
elements of schadenfreude regarding the difficulties experienced by Barclays, and the use of 
adjectives such as ‘bumper’ and ‘huge’ challenge accusations that EBF journalism is 
‘teeming with reverence for the accumulation of wealth’ (Solomon, 2001). Within this 
research sample therefore, the ‘age of austerity’ may be at least partly responsible for a 
considerable shift away from the supposed traditional norms of EBF journalism. 
Furthermore, and indicative of executive remuneration’s position within contemporary 
political agendas (Kuhnen & Niessen 2012, p.1250), it is conceivable that the reporting of the 
wider ‘Shareholder Spring’ played some part in the development of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Bill which received Royal Assent in April 2013. This bill provides 
binding votes for shareholders regarding executive remuneration, meaning that instead 
of being symbolic but ultimately powerless, shareholder rebellions over pay now 
actually determine policy. 
 
However, in terms of the wider ideals of accuracy and diversity within journalism, the 
conclusions are less positive. In answer to the first research question, the reports are 
characterised by simplified reports of congruent length, narratives of protest and conflict, a 
narrow range of social actor contributions and assertive, evaluative reporting which does not 
generally finesse the concept of shareholding. In sum, and returning to the model proposed by 
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McManus (1991), the pursuit of corporate profit (courting potential advertisers) and the 
institutional constraints (regulatory burdens) that shape news are not obviously evident within 
these reports. However, there is evidence that certain news values influence story 
presentation into forms and frames that viewers may find more appealing. 
 
ITV are arguably the most implicitly critical of Barclays, especially given their descriptions 
of secrecy and raucous criticism during the shareholder meeting. They alone attempt to 
unpick Diamond’s multi-layered and possibly ‘camouflaged’ remuneration package but their 
shorter, episodic presentation reduces the issue to the simplest form within the three reports. 
SKY provides what must be considered as the most comprehensive coverage, and makes 
attempts to contextualise and explain the wider implications of shareholder dissent. By 
referring to public sector pensions, they also potentially broaden the audience beyond the 
narrow demographic suggested by some EBF journalism research. Whether, as has been 
suggested, this is part of a highbrow upgrade of their brand or not, it seems that in this 
instance SKY operate over and above the requirements of a low regulatory burden and 
provide the most informative and recondite expression of the vote.  
 
Omitting social actor groups like remuneration committees, trade unions, institutional 
shareholders, academic commentators and truly independent experts, and misrepresenting 
shareholder power may have wider implications.  Consistent with findings by Tan & Crombie 
(2011), there are no direct contributions from any highly-paid executives, albeit they, like 
other social groups may have refused to appear. However, it seems unlikely that trade unions 
for example, would have turned down this opportunity, so it could be reasonably concluded 
that they were not asked to appear; if they were they certainly did not appear in the final 
edited packages. Notwithstanding the time constraints within TV reporting, in the case of the 
BBC, articulating executive remuneration in such narrow terms arguably breaches their 
impartiality model, especially notable when public service broadcasters are apparently 
considered to be the most trustworthy news suppliers (see Cushion, 2012, p.168). Redefined 
as a ‘wagon wheel’ incorporating a wider spectrum of opinion than the traditional left 
wing/right wing ‘see-saw’ binary (Bridcut, 2007, p.7), the concept of ‘impartiality’ is key to 
conclusions regarding the final research question. In the instance of the Barclays vote 
therefore, contributions from interested groups like trade unions and remuneration 
committees may have more closely achieved ‘wagon wheel impartiality’. 
 
SKY’s generally more informative report may support notions that despite continual financial 
losses, the channel is attempting to become ‘something more respectable than a purveyor of 
football, films and American dramas’ (Blighty 2011). Data produced by BARB (2014) 
reveals that at somewhere less than 750,000 viewers, SKY News bulletins lag some way 
behind the BBC 10pm bulletin (regularly over 4 million) and the ITV 6.30pm bulletin 
(regularly over 2.5 million). Notwithstanding audience size, it is still influential; in 2005, 
even the then head of BBC TV news told colleagues that SKY News ‘remains the first port of 
call for key opinion formers’ (Robinson 2005). SKY’s audience may therefore be smaller, but 
seemingly includes policymakers and commercial elites. However, despite its apparent 
eminence and possible strategic position as the legitimising ‘jewel in the crown’, Rupert 
Murdoch was prepared to sacrifice SKY News as part of the attempt to buy all the shares in 
BSkyB before the phone hacking scandal at the News of the World scuppered the deal 
(Cushion, Lewis, & Ramsay, 2012).   
 
Conclusion 
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Despite SKY’s prominence here, this three-way analysis supports notions that despite varying 
regulatory burdens, television news is to a large degree homogenous in terms of agenda and 
presentation (Barnett, 2012). Despite aspirations to provide ‘wagon wheel’ impartiality, the 
BBC presented the Barclays story in narrow terms and so it is difficult to resist Berry’s 
conclusion (2013, p.268) that ‘if it is to fulfil its mandate to provide a broad spectrum of 
opinion, there is a need to open up the parameters of economic debate in its most influential 
news programmes’. If the UK’s public service broadcaster does not provide such a range of 
opinion and the widest of possible pictures, commercial channels with less regulatory 
obligations can hardly be relied upon to do so, despite SKY ‘punching above its weight’ 
within this small sample.  This research suggests that journalism is still capable of holding 
business to account but while as a collective the three channels provide a reasonable analysis, 
no single report has the whole story of the Barclays vote. If Ofcom regulations were less, and 
broadcasters were given a completely free rein in terms of their editorial view (Barnett 2012) 
then the result may have been three reports, that when viewed in parallel, offer a wider 
analysis with contributions from executives, remuneration committees, politicians, trade 
unions and all types of shareholder.  
The reports and others like them may have encouraged executives to become more reflective 
about criticism of their pay. Moreover, they may have also played a part in reforming the 
remuneration practices of publically-listed companies. However, in terms of accuracy and a 
more cerbral approach, it is hard to conclude anything other than that televison news has not 
advanced executive remuneration debates much beyond the 20-year old assessment that the 
issue has reached ‘Marie Antoinette proportions’ and that people are ‘disgusted’ (Lublin 
1996). The executive remuneration narrative at Barclays is further complicated by increases 
in its bonus payments despite falling profits (Groom, 2014) and the shedding of thousands of 
its UK jobs (BBC, 2014). In this most recent context therefore, the general compulsion to 
simplify is even less useful in helping viewers to make sense of these wider debates. 
 
CDA has revealed the thrust of these broadcast reports, and references to political economy 
and varying regulatory obligations has enabled some conclusions about the possible 
ideological motivations of SKY, BBC and ITV. Given that much of UK programming 
concerning business and commerce such as The Apprentice, Undercover Boss and Dragon’s 
Den is primarly produced to entertain, it falls to factual genres like news to inform wider 
understandings of commercial issues such as remuneration practice. During times of 
austerity, much of the population experiences some degree of economic discomfort; it seems 
reasonable that it should be widely represented and that diverse stakeholder and social groups 
should be provided with a voice. These findings suggest that without erudite, probing 
journalism, wider news audiences may not be given access to justfications for, and less 
emotional criticisms of executive pay, wide-ranging social actor opinion, the contextualising 
of the issue within the wider economic system, or insights into the realities of private and 
institutional stockholding. For different reasons and to different degrees, it seems that these 
three broadcasters have missed the opportunity to nuance concepts of austerity, shareholder 
agency and inequality, and so have some distance to travel in order to move beyond simple 
notions of ‘fat cats’ and protest. 
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